Abstract. In this paper we show a new differential fault analysis (DFA) on the AES-128 key scheduling process. We can obtain 96 bits of the key with 2 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts enabling an easy exhaustive key search of 2 32 keys. Furthermore we can retrieve the entire 128 bits with 4 pairs. To the authors' best knowledge, it is the smallest number of pairs to find the entire AES-128 key with a fault attack on the key scheduling process. Up to now 7 pairs by Takahashi et al. were the best. By corrupting state, not the key schedule, Piret and Quisquater showed 2 pairs are enough to break AES-128 in 2003. The advantage of DFA on the key schedule is that it can defeat some fault-protected AES implementations where the round keys are not rescheduled prior to the check. We implemented our algorithm on a 3.2 GHz Pentium 4 PC. With 4 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts, we could find 128 bits less than 2.3 seconds.
Introduction
Boneh et al. introduced the fault attack on the implementation of RSA-CRT (Chinese Remainder Theorem) with the errors induced by the fault injection in September 1996 [5] . After that, many papers have been published on this subject. In October 1996, Biham and Shamir published a fault attack on secret key cryptosystems entitled Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) [2] . On the 2 not target only the AES key schedule. He used the faults in the intermediate state as well. Recently Peacham and Thomas improved DFA on AES key scheduling [10] . They assumed that random faults are injected during the execution of the AES key scheduling process and that the resulting faults propagate to all keys after the injection. They reduced the number of correct and faulty ciphertexts to 12 pairs to recover 128-bit key. Takahashi et al. generalized Peacham and Thomas's attack and reduced the required number of pairs more [13] . They succeeded in recovering 128-bit key with 7 pairs.
In this paper, we propose a new DFA on AES key scheduling process. Our attack takes advantage of faults occurring in the 9 th round of the AES key scheduling process. Thus the fault model and the hypothesis on the fault location are exactly the same as in Peacham and Thomas' and Takahashi et al.'s. However the way we exploit faults is different from theirs. We retrieved the entire 128-bit key of AES-128 with 4 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts. Two pairs are enough to recover 96 bits of the key enabling an easy exhaustive key search of the remaining 2 32 keys. We implemented our algorithm on a 3.2 GHz Pentium 4 PC. With 4 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts we found 128 bits in less than 2.3 seconds.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly describe AES. The review on the previous DFA on AES Key schedule is presented in Section 3. Our analysis methodology is presented in Section 4. Section 5 compares our attack with previous attacks, with the conclusion given in Section 6.
AES
AES [1] can encrypt and decrypt 128 bits of block with 128, 192, or 256 bits of key. In this paper we will only deal with the 128-bit key variant, AES-128, as it is the most widely used. Our attack can be extended trivially to other variants. The intermediate computation result of AES-128, called State is usually represented by a 4 × 4 matrix, each cell of which is a byte as shown in Fig. 1 In the rest of the paper, we will use the following additional notations: AES-128 has 10 rounds. Each round function is composed of 4 transformations except the last round: SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, and AddRoundKey. The last round is lacking MixColumns. Our attack focuses on the last two rounds. They are depicted in Fig. 2 . SubBytes It is made up of the application of 16 identical 8 × 8 S-boxes. This is a non-linear byte substitution. We denote the function of SubBytes SB. That is, SB(S i ) = SubBytes(S i ). For the simplicity, we define that SB also can take a byte and two bytes as an input as follows:
We denote Inverse SubBytes SB −1 . We define that SB −1 also can take bytes as an input.
ShiftRows Each row of the State is cyclically shifted over different offsets. Row 0 is not shifted, row 1 is shifted by 1 byte, row 2 is shifted by 2 bytes, and row 3 by 3 bytes. We denote ShiftRows and its inverse, InverseShiftRows, SR and SR −1 respectively. We also define that they can take bytes as an input.
MixColumns This is a linear transformation to each column of the State. Each column is considered as polynomial over F 2 8 and multiplied modulo x 4 + 1 with a fixed polynomial a(x) = 03 * x 3 + 01 * x 2 + 01 * x + 02.
AddRoundKey It is a bitwise XOR with a round key.
We briefly describe the last two rounds, 9 th and 10 th rounds, of the key scheduling process as shown in Fig. 3 . The input 128-bit key is divided into four 32-bit columns. The first 32-bit column propagates to the next column in the same round, which generates the second column. The second and third columns do the same. The fourth column propagates to the next round through the function RotWord, which performs a cyclic permutation and SubWord, which applies S-box. Each column generated in the key process is grouped to yield the 128-bit round key.
Previous Works about DFA on AES Key Schedule
The first DFA on AES key schedule was done by Giraud, but still needs to attack the intermediate state [8] . He presented two fault attacks on the AES. Both require the ability to obtain several faulty ciphertexts originating from the same plaintext (contrary to our attack). The first one assumes it is possible to induce a fault on only one bit of an intermediate state. Under this condition, 50 faulty ciphertexts are necessary to retrieve the full key. The second attack exploits faults on bytes. It requires the ability of inducing faults at several chosen places both on key scheduling process and intermediate state. Therefore, the second is the first attempt of attack on key scheduling process, but it is not complete. Because it still needs to attack on the intermediate state. It could retrieve the key with 250 faulty ciphertexts. If he extends his hypothesis by supposing that In 2003, Chen and Yen improved Giraud's attack [6] . They could retrieve the key with fewer faulty ciphertexts and with less computational complexity. Giraud's second attack is composed of three steps, an attack on 9 th round key, an attack on 8 th round key, and an attack on 8 th round intermediate state. The first two steps of Chen and Yen's method are similar to Giraud's. But the third step focuses on the Inverse SubBytes and requires less samples.
Unlike the previous two attacks, Peacham and Thomas assumes that random faults are injected during the execution of the AES key scheduling process and the resulting faults propagate to all keys after the injection [10] . They showed that 12 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts are enough to retrieve the whole key without brute-force search. They assumed that all bytes of a 32-bit column of the 9 th round key are corrupted during the execution of the key scheduling process. Their attack consists of four steps. They use the fact that the intermediate state calculated by the correct ciphertext just before the AddRoundKey of the 9 th round is equal to the intermediate state calculated by the faulty ciphertext just before the AddRoundKey of the 9 th round.
In 2007, Takahashi et al. generalized Peacham and Thomas's attack and reduced the required number of pairs [13] . They could retrieve the whole key with 7 pairs and 80 bits of the key with 2 pairs. Recently they improved their attack a little bit by assuming that faults are injected into 32 bits of one column [12] . They found 88 bits with 2 pairs but still they need 7 pairs to find 128 bits.
Our DFA on AES Key Schedule
In this section we describe our attack. After presenting our fault model, we describe our basic attack that retrieves 32 bits of the key with 2 pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts giving a one byte random error on 9 th round key scheduling process. Then we improve our attack by giving a random fault on three bytes of a 32-bit column of the 9 th round key scheduling process. We can retrieve 96 bits of the key with 2 pairs, and all 128 bits with 4 pairs.
Fault model
We assume that a random fault is induced in the 9 th round of the AES key scheduling process and some bytes of the first column of the 9 th round key are corrupted. In addition, we assume that the attacker can obtain pairs of correct and faulty outputs from the same input. However we do not need the several faulty outputs with the same plaintext.
The fault model and hypothesis on the fault location are exactly the same as in Peacham th round. Secondly they try to find the 9 th round key but we find the 10 th round key. Finally we try to remove impossible candidates for 10 th round key, but they try to find directly the correct 9 th round key. It is quite interesting to refer DFA on AES state. Piret and Quisquater's DFA on AES state [11] requires the minimum number of the ciphertexts even though they use the same fault model and the hypothesis on the fault location of Dusart et al.'s attack [7] . The way Dusart et al. exploit faults is quite similar to Peacham and Thomas' and Takahashi et al.'s. Dusart et al. write and solve a system of equations of which the unknown value is the one of the fault. Our way of exploiting faults follows the way of Piret and Quisquater's.
Basic attack
We assume that one byte of the first column of the 9 th round key is corrupted. For simplicity, we assume K 9 0,0 is corrupted into K 9 0,0 . The attack can be applied when another byte is corrupted. We denote the difference between them as a, i.e., a = K 
where, C 0 is the 32-bit first row of the correct ciphertext, C * 0 is the 32-bit first row of the faulty ciphertext, K In the above paragraph we assumed that we needed to guess K 10 0 only and we knew other parameters. However, to solve the equation (1) This consideration leads to the following sketch of our basic attack. We need two pairs of the correct and faulty ciphertexts (C, C * ) and (D, D * ). We do not need to have the same faulty value in K 9 0,0 for these two pairs. We define the error during the computation of C * as a 1 , i.e., a 1 = K Step 1. We compute the candidate for (K Step 2. We compute the candidate for (K ( Step 3. We compute the candidate for (K . Therefore with 8 pairs, we can find the entire 128 bits of 10 th round key. We can easily compute the initial key with 10 th round key, see [7] . 
Then we can compute d from the value of b and K 10 1 (this comes from the structure of the AES keys scheduling process) as follows:
Because we know the value of d, we only do not know the value of a in the first row of difference of K 10 as shown in (c) of Fig. 5 . Therefore we can apply the basic attack to the first row and find K 10 0 .
We summarize how to find 64 bits of K 10 as follows:
Algorithm 4
1. We can further improve the attack in case three bytes of the first column of 9 th round key are corrupted. As shown in Fig. 6 , let us denote e = K We again implemented our improved attack on the same PC. To find 96 bits of the key with 2 pairs, average 1.8 seconds are required. To compute 128 bits with 4 pairs, it requires 2.3 seconds in average.
Comparison with previous attacks
We compared our attack with previous attacks in terms of the relation between the retrieved bits of key and the required number of pairs as shown in Fig. 7 .
We also compared in terms of the number of fault injection points in Fig. 8 . In both cases, we can see our proposed method is the best.
If we have only two pairs of the correct and wrong ciphertexts, we can compute 96 bits with our attack and need to do an exhaustive search for the other 32 bits. We estimated the time for the exhaustive search based on the simulation result of [13] . On a normal PC, the estimated calculation time of the 32-bit exhaustive search is about 8 minutes. If we use Takahashi et al.'s attack, we need to do an 40-bit exhaustive search, which requires about 3 days. 
Conclusions
We proposed a new differential fault analysis on AES key schedule. Only two pairs of correct and faulty ciphertexts are enough to find the whole key of AES-128 with DFA on AES state by Piret and Quisquater. In the area of DFA on AES key schedule, still we needed many pairs. However our proposed method reduced the gap between DFA on state and DFA on key schedule. Ours requires two pairs for retrieving 96 bits of the key enabling an easy exhaustive key search of 2 32 keys and four pairs for 128 bits without an exhaustive key search. Our result shows the minimum number of pairs and that of fault injection points than the previous attacks. It takes about 2 seconds to retrieve 128 bits with four pairs on the normal PC. With two faults it takes about 8 minutes to find 128 bits.
The general countermeasure against DPA on AES state is to recompute the last three rounds of AES and compare it with the original output. However, if the key schedule is not re-done for the re-computation of the last three rounds it cannot prevent DPA on AES key schedule. Therefore we can conclude that key scheduling process as well as encryption process should be protected against fault attacks.
